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Humans value rewards less when these are delivered in the future as opposed to
immediately, a phenomenon referred to as delay discounting. While delay discounting
has been studied during the anticipation of rewards and in the context of intertemporal
decision-making, little is known about its neural correlates in the outcome phase
(during reward delivery) and their relation to personality. Personality traits that have
been associated with increased delay discounting include impulsivity and, potentially,
anxious-depressive traits. Here we performed functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) in 72 healthy participants while they carried out a monetary incentive delay
(MID) task with a delay manipulation. In sixty percent of the experimental trials,
participants won rewards that differed in magnitude (0.05e, 0.50e or 1e) and delay
until delivery (immediately, 10 days, or 100 days). A factor analysis on questionnaires
yielded two factors reflecting Impulsivity and Anxiety/Depression, which we used to
examine potential relationships between personality and delay discounting. When
winning a reward, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activation was higher for immediate
compared to delayed rewards. Moreover, amygdala activation correlated with reward
magnitude for immediate but not for delayed rewards. Amygdala activation to
winning immediate rewards was higher in more impulsive participants, while mPFC
activation to winning immediate rewards was higher in more anxious-depressed
participants. Our results uncover neural correlates of delay discounting during reward
delivery, and suggest that impulsivity and subclinical anxious-depressive traits are
related to stronger neural responses for winning immediate relative to delayed
rewards.
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INTRODUCTION
Animals and humans typically prefer immediate over delayed
rewards, even if the latter are of larger absolute value
(Rachlin and Green, 1972; Mischel and Underwood, 1974;
Ainslie, 1975; Mazur, 1988; Dshemuchadse et al., 2013). The
phenomenon of delay discounting is evident in daily decisions
like food choices or smoking behavior and poses a challenge
to health education. To elucidate neural mechanisms of delay
discounting, several studies have adapted delay discounting
paradigms to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI;
for recent reviews, see Peters and Büchel, 2011; van den
Bos and McClure, 2013). For this purpose, most previous
studies worked with experimental designs that involved decisions
between two rewards that differed in magnitude and delay
until delivery (McClure et al., 2004, 2007; Kable and Glimcher,
2007, 2010). While this approach has yielded important
insights into the neural basis of delay discounting, it has
two limitations. First, decision-making is likely to engage
several different cognitive processes, most prominently the
valuation of rewards and action selection processes (see Rangel
et al., 2008; Liu et al., 2012), and the commonly employed
choice paradigms do not allow one to distinguish between
these subprocesses. Second, framing effects, as proposed by
cognitive delay discounting theories (Trope and Liberman, 2003;
Zauberman and Lynch, 2005), may occur because valuation
of one option is always affected by an available alternative
(Marjorie, 1993).
Because the decision component of delay discounting may
cognitively resemble other decision-making processes, the
unique properties of delay discounting might actually lie in the
valuation component. Valuation automatically occurs whenever
humans encounter stimuli in their environment (Lebreton et al.,
2009). Few studies so far have been specifically directed at
the dissociation of valuation and decision-making components
within delay discounting. In a two-phase paradigm employed
by Liu et al. (2012), participants first evaluated two options
(one immediate, one delayed; i.e., valuation phase), and made
their decisions only in the second phase. In the valuation phase
only, activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
ventral striatum (VS), and posterior cingulate cortex correlated
with value, while the decision-making phase engaged lateral
prefrontal cortices. However, given the study design participants
may already have engaged in decision-making during the first
phase of a trial. The safest way to exclude decision-making all
together is to only present one option at a time, for example
by using a monetary incentive delay (MID) task (Knutson et al.,
2001a). Luo et al. (2009) adapted the MID task to study delay
discounting (see also Luo et al., 2011). At the beginning of
each trial, a cue predicting either an immediate reward or a
delayed reward (e.g., $28 in 4 months) was presented, and
participants could win the reward by responding to a target. The
authors found that brain regions implicated in value processing
(e.g., putamen, anterior insula) responded more strongly to
immediate vs. delayed rewards, even though the immediate and
the delayed rewards were preference-matched. Since only one
reward was anticipated at a time, activation differences could
only reflect valuation ormotivational processes, but not decision-
making.
Luo et al. (2009) focused on the effects of delay discounting
during reward anticipation. One may argue, however, that
valuation does not only occur during anticipation, but also in the
outcome phase when participants have overcome the uncertainty
inherent in the anticipation phase. Knutson et al. (2001b) showed
that, in healthy young adults, anticipation and delivery of rewards
engage largely distinct neural processes, with the VS/nucleus
accumbens (NAcc) responding to cues signaling an upcoming
reward, while the delivery of a previously anticipated reward
is primarily associated with activation of regions in the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC; see also Knutson et al., 2003; Schott
et al., 2007). Given the role of the mPFC in coding stimulus
value and personal preferences (Knutson et al., 2005; Ludwig
et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2015), it seems important to consider
the outcome phase when investigating the valuation component
of delay discounting. In the present study, we used a variant
of the MID task, but, unlike Luo et al. (2009), who only
reported the neural correlates of delay discounting during reward
anticipation, we focused our analyses on the outcome phase.
While high degrees of delay discounting can be observed in a
number of neuropsychiatric disorders like drug addiction (Kirby
and Petry, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2005), pathological gambling
(Petry, 2001; Alessi and Petry, 2003), ADHD (Scheres et al.,
2006, 2008), or Cluster B personality disorders (e.g., Petry, 2002),
delay discounting is also subject to considerable interindividual
variability within the healthy population (Odum, 2011). Despite
the heterogeneity of models of personality (e.g., Costa and
McCrae, 1992a; Cloninger et al., 1993), a few personality traits
are widely accepted, and their corresponding constructs can
be found in most established models. Among those traits,
impulsivity in particular has repeatedly been associated with
behavioral and neural measures of delay discounting. Impulsivity
can be broadly defined as the tendency to act on arising
impulses without much thinking or planning, and it is likely
to be a complex, multifaceted construct (Patton et al., 1995;
Evenden, 1999). A particularly strong preference for immediate
compared to delayed rewards (i.e., high delay discounting) is
thought to be a key feature of impulsivity. Indeed, tasks of
intertemporal decision-making have consistently demonstrated a
positive relationship between impulsivity and delay discounting
(but see Reynolds et al., 2006; de Wit et al., 2007; Mobini
et al., 2007; Koff and Lucas, 2011), in line with the increased
delay discounting rates in psychiatric disorders associated with
high impulsivity (e.g., Petry, 2002). At the neural level, Sripada
et al. (2011) showed that more impulsive participants exhibited
reduced anterior mPFC activation during decisions that involved
one immediate option as compared to decisions involving only
delayed options (see also Hariri et al., 2006; Luhmann et al., 2008;
Jimura et al., 2013).
Another important construct widely accepted as a personality
trait is the (subclinical) presence of anxious and depressive
symptoms, both of which contribute to concepts like neuroticism
(NEO-Five Factor Inventory [NEO-FFI]; Costa and McCrae,
1992a) or harm avoidance (Temperament and Character
Inventory [TCI]; Cloninger, 1994). While impulsivity has rather
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consistently been linked to high delay discounting rates, a
potential relationship between anxious-depressive traits and
delay discounting has thus far received little attention. One
study has found that individuals high on social anxiety
demonstrate higher delay discounting rates than those low
on social anxiety (Rounds et al., 2007). More generally,
psychiatric disorders involving anxiety or depression have
been associated with altered reward processing (Elman et al.,
2005; Tremblay et al., 2005; Hopper et al., 2008; Sailer et al.,
2008; Aupperle and Paulus, 2010). It is therefore conceivable
that subclinical anxious-depressive traits may affect neural
or behavioral manifestations of delay discounting, although
it is not straightforward to predict the direction of the
correlation: While models of approach vs. avoidance might
predict, if at all, lower delay discounting in anxious or
depressed individuals, the study by Rounds et al. (2007) suggests
stronger delay discounting effects in more anxious-depressed
individuals.
In the present study we investigate the neural underpinnings
of delay discounting without decision-making in the outcome
phase and further assess how individual differences in
impulsivity and anxious-depressive traits relate to those
neural processes. In our MID-paradigm participants could win
rewards that differed in both magnitude and delay until delivery.
The paradigm also included a behavioral measure: on each
trial participants had to carry out a simple classification task in
order to have the chance to gain a reward. Reaction times (RTs)
during this task served as an indicator of participants’ incentive
motivation to obtain each specific reward.
Neuroanatomically, we focused on the VS, mPFC, and
amygdala because these regions have been commonly associated
with reward and emotional processing (Knutson et al., 2001a,b,
2003; Hommer et al., 2003; Heekeren et al., 2007; Plichta et al.,
2009; Schardt et al., 2010); and activation in mPFC (Sripada et al.,
2011) and in the VS (McClure et al., 2004) have specifically been
linked to the processing of the immediacy of rewards (Table 1).
We hypothesized: (i) a main effect of reward magnitude on the
VS and mPFC (in line with previous findings) and (ii) a main
effect of delay on the VS, the mPFC, and the amygdala in that
these regions would show increased activation during winning
immediate (compared to delayed) rewards (‘‘immediacy effect’’).
We further hypothesized (iii) an interaction of delay and reward
magnitude that was thought to reflect a stronger magnitude effect
for immediate (compared to delayed) rewards.
We further aimed to assess to what extent individual
differences in impulsivity and anxious-depressive traits
might correlate with the differences of neural responses to
immediate vs. delayed rewards. With respect to impulsivity,
we hypothesized that (iv) more impulsive participants would
show stronger activation in the VS or amygdala—and possibly
reduced activation in the mPFC—when winning immediate
(compared to delayed) rewards, as compared to less impulsive
participants (e.g., Mobini et al., 2007). Regarding anxious-
depressive traits, we also expected to find (v) a correlation
between these traits and neural effects of immediacy during
outcome although we had no specific hypotheses about the
direction.
Behaviorally, we expected participants to show shorter RTs
to both larger and immediate rewards compared to smaller and
delayed rewards, respectively (i.e., main effects of magnitude
and delay, as well as potentially an interaction of magnitude ×
delay). Moreover, we expected that the effect of delay would
be associated with longer RTs in more impulsive individuals,
while we had no directional hypothesis with respect to RTs in
participants with anxious-depressive traits.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Our study cohort consisted of seventy-two young (mean age =
23.10, range 20–29, SD = 2.23) healthy, right-handed, volunteers
(35 female) recruited from the campus community of the
University of Bonn, Germany. Eight additional participants
were excluded from data analysis due to poor quality of the
fMRI data and/or excessive movement during MRI acquisition
(n = 4), incidental pathological findings in T1-weighted MR
images (n = 3), and a defective anatomical image (n = 1). In
all analyses involving questionnaires, we included only the 62
participants with complete data sets. In all other analyses, we
included all 72 participants (62 with complete datasets + 10
with partly missing questionnaire data). All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were native speakers
of German. None of the participants reported any current or past
neurological, psychiatric, or medical illness (including alcohol or
illegal drug abuse), or use of medication affecting cerebral blood
flow or brain metabolism. Thirty-three of the participants were
smokers. The study was approved by the University of Bonn
Ethics Committee, and written informed consent was obtained
from each participant in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. Participants received financial compensation for their
participation.
Behavioral Paradigm and Experimental
Design
Participants carried out a variant of the MID task, allowing the
assessment of blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) responses
to reward anticipation and outcome (Figure 1). Each participant
was first provided with both written and verbal task instructions
and performed a short training version of the experiment outside
the scanner to minimize learning effects during the experiment
and to ensure compliance with the procedure.
At the beginning of each trial, one of nine possible rewards
(3 amounts [1e, 0.50e, 0.05e] × 3 payoff times [immediately,
in 10 days, in 100 days]) was presented as an abstract image
cue for 1.5 s (anticipation; Figure 1). The reward cue was
followed by a delay period during which a fixation cross was
presented for 3 s. After the delay, a symbol was presented on
the screen, and participants were instructed to classify it as a
square or a triangle by pressing a button with their left or right
index finger (counterbalanced across participants). Squares and
triangles were presented in randomized order. RTs were recorded
as a behavioral measure of incentive motivation. If the button
press was carried out correctly and within 1.5 s after target onset,
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TABLE 1 | Regions of interest (ROIs).
ROI Type and origin of the ROI Motivation for selecting the ROI
mPFC ROI from the Stanford atlas of functional ROIs (Shirer et al.,
2012)
- implicated in the outcome phase of MID tasks (Knutson
et al., 2001b, 2003)
- associated with impulsivity (e.g., Sripada et al., 2011)
VS Combined anatomical and literature-based ROI (Zweynert
et al., 2011)
- a key region for reward processing (Heekeren et al., 2007;
Staudinger et al., 2011)
- associated with impulsivity (e.g., Jimura et al., 2013)
Amygdala Anatomical ROI from the AAL atlas as implemented in the
WFU Pickatlas (Maldjian et al., 2003)
- a key region for reward processing and emotional
processing (e.g., Hommer et al., 2003; Plichta et al., 2009;
Schardt et al., 2010; Patin and Hurlemann, 2011),
- associated with impulsivity (e.g., Shao et al., 2013).
An illustration of the location and extent of the ROIs can be found in Supplementary Table S1.
participants had a 60% chance of winning the anticipated reward.
Participants were informed that their RTs had no influence
on their chance of winning a reward, as long as the response
occurred within 1.5 s. Reward delivery (win trial) or omission
(omission trial) was indicated by a feedback, which was presented
for another 2 s (outcome period). In win trials, the outcome
screen confirmed the anticipated reward and delay in written
words, while in omission trials the outcome screen stated ‘‘no
win’’. Omission trials were included in the experimental design
to prevent habituation and decreasing attention, and tominimize
the correlation between the anticipation phase and the win-
outcome phase. Each trial lasted 8 s. Trials were presented in a
randomized order and separated by a variable inter-trial interval
(range 1–6.4 s). The experiment consisted of two runs, each
lasting about 23 min with a total number of 234 trials (26 of each
condition).
All rewards gained in the ‘‘today’’ win trials were paid to the
participants in cash immediately after the experiment. The gains
of the ‘‘in 10 days’’ or ‘‘in 100 days’’ win trials were transferred to
their bank accounts either 10 or 100 days after the experiment.
The Presentation software package (Neurobehavioral Systems,
CA, USA) was used for stimulus presentation, synchronization
of the stimulus display to fMRI data acquisition, and recording
of participants’ behavioral responses. Stimuli were presented
using video goggles (Nordic-Neuro-Lab, Norway). Behavioral
responses were recorded via two fiber-optics response pads.
Questionnaire Measures
We used data from several well-established questionnaires
testing anxious-depressive and/or impulsive personality traits.
Specifically, we included scores from Spielberger’s State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (trait score only; STAI-T; German version by
Spielberger et al., 1970; Laux et al., 1981), from Beck’s
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1996; German version by
Hautzinger et al., 2000), and from the NEO-FFI (Costa
and McCrae, 1992b) in the German translation by
FIGURE 1 | Task and design. Participants were presented with a cue signaling the magnitude of an upcoming reward (0.05e, 0.50e or 1e) and the delay to
delivery (0, 10, or 100 days). After correctly responding to a simple task (classifying squares and triangles), participants were rewarded with the anticipated amount in
60% of trials, and they were informed about the outcome at the end of each trial.
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Borkenau and Ostendorf (1993), which includes 60 items.
The NEO-FFI contains the subscales neuroticism, extraversion,
openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.
Furthermore, we included data from the TCI by Cloninger (1994;
German version by Richter et al., 1999). This scale includes 240
items, but here we were only interested in the three subscales
novelty seeking, harm avoidance, and reward dependence,
corresponding to 99 items only. Finally, we used the total score
of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11), which consists of
30 items and assesses general impulsivity (BIS-11; Patton et al.,
1995).
Factor Analysis of Questionnaire Data
The considerable overlap of the constructs assessed with
currently established personality questionnaires like the NEO-
FFI or the TCI has been noted by several authors (De Fruyt
et al., 2000; Aluja and Blanch, 2011). Because we had no
a priori hypothesis with respect to which questionnaire would
best reflect the intermediate phenotypes of interest and in order
to avoid a large number of multiple comparisons, we carried
out a factor analysis on the questionnaire data to determine
factors that reflected impulsive and axious-depressive traits
in our variables (for similar approaches, see Whiteside and
Lynam, 2003; Aluja and Blanch, 2011). We initially entered the
variables BIS-11 total score, BDI, the 5 NEO-factors, STAI-T,
and the 3 TCI-variables. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures
of sampling adequacy (see Kaiser, 1970) for NEO openness, NEO
agreeableness, and TCI reward dependence were lower than 0.50.
Therefore, these variables were excluded from the factor analysis.
With the remaining 8 variables included, KMO-value for the set
of variables was 0.73, indicating that our data were well-suited for
factor analysis. Factors were orthogonalized using direct oblimin
rotation (delta = 0). Factors with eigenvalues greater than 1
were retained (Kaiser, 1960). Factor scores were calculated for
each participant using the regression method. All behavioral and
questionnaire data were analyzed using SPSS 19.0 (Chicago, IL,
USA) software.
Analysis of the Behavior on the Visual
Discrimination Task
First, participants’ response accuracy was calculated to ascertain
that participants were attentive and motivated during the
experiment. Median instead of mean accuracy was calculated
across participants because the accuracy data were not normally
distributed.
Second, we calculated median RTs for all correct button
presses in the visual discrimination task per condition and
participant. Median instead of mean RTs were used on the single-
subject level because medians are robust to outliers and non-
normal distribution. At the group level, RTs did not violate
assumptions of a normal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests: all p > 0.10, Bonferroni-corrected). We therefore analyzed
these RTs in all participants (n = 72) using a mixed ANOVA
with the within-subject factors delay (0 days, 10 days, 100 days)
and magnitude (0.05e, 0.50e, 1e). Because the within-subject
factors had more than two levels, Greenhouse-Geisser correction
for non-sphericity was applied to the degrees of freedom. In
order to determine if the factor scores Anxiety-Depression and
Impulsivity were systematically related to RTs on the task, in a
second step we included these factor scores as covariates (for the
62 participants with complete datasets).
fMRI Data Acquisition and Preprocessing
Functional MRI was acquired using a 1.5T Avanto MRI
system (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). T2∗-weightedMR images
were acquired with a gradient-echo echoplanar imaging (EPI)
sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 50 ms, flip angle = 90◦,
ascending order). Twenty-three axial slices were collected
(thickness 3.3 mm; gap 1.1 mm; field of view 210 mm) using a
4-channel head coil. Slices were oriented parallel to the anterior
commissure—posterior commissure line so that they covered the
mesolimbic and prefrontal regions of interest (ROI). We also
collected a high-resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared
rapid gradient echo (MP-RAGE) anatomical image (160 sagittal
slices covering the whole head; thickness 1 mm; gap 0.5 mm; field
of view 256 mm).
Functional MRI data were analyzed using Statistical
Parametric Mapping (SPM8, Wellcome Trust Center for
Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK1)
running on Matlab 7.11.0 (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). T2∗-
weighted EPIs were corrected for acquisition delay and spatially
registered to the first acquired image (without reslicing). Each
participant’s high-resolution anatomical image was co-registered
to the mean EPI obtained from realignment and was then
segmented into gray matter, white matter, and CSF, using the
segmentation algorithm provided by SPM. (Note: For three
participants, the anatomical image was not obtained in the
course of this study. In these cases, we used an anatomical
image from the respective participant obtained in the course
of a different study, but within 3 months of study time). The
transformation parameters obtained from segmentation were
used as normalization parameters for transformation of the
EPIs into a standard stereotactic reference frame (Montreal
Neurological Institute, MNI; voxel size = 3 × 3 × 3 mm).
Normalized images were smoothed using an isotropic Gaussian
kernel of 8 mm full-width half-maximum. Low frequency drifts
were removed using a high pass filter with a cut-off of 128 s
during the analysis. Intrinsic autocorrelations were corrected
using a restricted maximum likelihood (ReML) algorithm using
an autoregressive model of 1st order (AR1).
fMRI Data Analysis
Statistical analysis was performed using a two-stage mixed
effects model. At the first stage, general linear model (GLM)-
based analyses of brain activity patterns were performed
for each participant. For each of the two runs, the GLM
included nine regressors for the experimental conditions in
the anticipation period (duration: 4.5 s), one regressor for the
visual discrimination task (duration: 1.5 s), nine regressors for
the ‘‘win’’ outcome periods (duration: 2 s), nine regressors for
the ‘‘omission’’ period (duration: 2 s), and one regressor for
1www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm
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outcomes of missed or incorrect responses (duration: 2 s). For
all regressors, stick functions at stimulus onset were convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) and
down-sampled for each scan. Additionally, the six rigid-body
transformation parameters obtained from realignment were
included in the model for each session, plus a single constant
representing the mean over scans. Model estimation was carried
out with a ReML fit, and contrasts of interest were computed over
the resulting parameter estimates.
At the second level, contrasts of parameter estimates
were submitted to flexible-factorial random effects models.
Specifically, we computed two separate second level ANOVA
models: one for the anticipation phases, and one for the win-
outcome phases. Omission-outcomes were not analyzed further.
Nine first-level contrasts for anticipation (all nine conditions
against baseline) or nine first-level contrasts for win-outcomes
(all nine conditions against baseline) were entered as regressors
into these two separate analyses. The reason for contrasting gain
outcomes with baseline rather than with omission outcomes was
that omissions of expected outcomes would elicit a negative
prediction error (Abler et al., 2005) that would depend on
the expected value (EV; the product of gain magnitude and
probability; see Knutson et al., 2005) and thus on individual
task performance. Because we did not include a jitter between
cues and feedback stimuli, our design could not account
completely for a certain degree of correlation between the
anticipation phase and the win outcome phase, but we aimed to
minimize this problem by keeping the average gain probability
at approximately 60%, and by modeling first degree serial
autocorrelations during data analysis (see below).
In these flexible factorial analyses, we specified the factors
delay (3 levels, independence not assumed, equal variances
assumed),magnitude (3 levels, independence not assumed, equal
variances assumed), and subject (72 levels, accounts for task-
unrelated between-subject variance, independence assumed,
equal variances assumed). For both phases, the regressors in the
design matrix were thus: 0.05e in 0 days, 0.50e in 0 days, 1e in
0 days, 0.05e in 10 days, 0.50e in 10 days, 1e in 10 days, 0.05e
in 100 days, 0.50e in 100 days, and 1e in 100 days, followed by
one regressor per subject.
One-tailed second-level T-contrasts were then computed. In
order to validate our study design, we first aimed to replicate
results of previous studies by calculating effects of reward
magnitude for both anticipation and win outcomes, comparing
the highest with the lowest reward in both phases (1e > 0.05,
contrast: [−1 0 1 −1 0 1 –1 0 1]). Previous studies have shown
that higher rewards (compared to lower rewards) elicit higher
BOLD-signal in VS during anticipation and higher signal in
mPFC (and sometimes VS) during win-outcomes (e.g., Knutson
et al., 2001a,b; Hommer et al., 2003), and we thus expected to
find the same activations if our design worked as intended. After
this validation step, we tested our main hypotheses regarding
immediacy and delay of rewards, using the following contrasts:
effect of immediacy (0 days > 10 days and 100 days) [2 2
2 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1]; effect of a short vs. a long delay
(10 days > 100 days) [0 0 0 1 1 1 −1 −1 −1]; interaction of
immediacy with magnitude (stronger effect for 1e > 0.05e for
0 days compared to 10 and 100 days): [−2 0 2 1 0 −1 1 0
−1]. Even though we were mainly interested in the outcome
phase, for completeness we also calculated these contrasts for the
anticipation phase.
We focused our analyses on a priori defined ROIs using
three bilateral masks: (i) VS; (ii) mPFC; and (iii) amygdala
(Table 1; Supplementary Figure S1). Our ROIs served to spatially
constrain our analyses, and for the purpose of family-wise error
(FWE)-correction for the respective ROI volumes. The voxel-
wise significance level was set to p < 0.017, FWE-corrected for
the ROI volumes (corresponding to a Bonferroni-corrected 0.05,
because small-volume FWE correction was applied to each of the
three ROIs separately).
Brain-Behavior Correlations
We then tested for a potential relationship between personality
traits (Impulsivity, Anxiety-Depression) and BOLD responses
to immediate vs. delayed rewards in the outcome phase. For
this purpose, we extracted mean beta values from the regions
that showed effects of immediacy at a corrected significance
level (either a main effect of immediacy, or an interaction
of immediacy × magnitude). To this end, we determined the
group peak voxel of the second level contrasts of immediacy or
immediacy × magnitude and created a spherical (r = 5 mm)
ROI centered around this group peak coordinate. Mean beta
values were extracted from all voxels located in this sphere for
all participants using the MarsBaR ROI analysis toolbox.2 We
then computed the difference between the mean beta over all
magnitudes for immediate rewards (0 days) minus the mean beta
over all magnitudes for delayed rewards (10 days and 100 days)
within these spheres as a neural marker of delay discounting.
Next, correlations were computed between this neural measure
of immediacy effects and the two factors Anxiety-Depression
and Impulsivity (two-tailed testing). Pearson’s correlations were
used whenever data were normally distributed, and Spearman’s
correlations were used when data did not meet normal
distribution.
RESULTS
Factor Analysis of the Questionnaire Data
Means and standard deviations of all questionnaires are shown
in Table 2. In all participants, scores of the BDI and STAI-T
were below clinical cut-off. Our factor analysis identified two
factors in our questionnaire data that explained 70.33% of the
total variance (Table 3). The first factor, which was termed
Anxiety-Depression was characterized by positive contributions
of NEO—Neuroticism, TCI-Harm Avoidance, STAI-T and
BDI and by a negative contribution of NEO—Extraversion.
The second factor, henceforth referred to as Impulsivity,
constituted of high scores in TCI—Novelty Seeking and BIS-
11 total and by low scores in NEO—Conscientiousness. To
verify the reliability of the thus obtained constructs, we
performed the factor analysis in an independent cohort of
125 participants who had completed a largely comparable
2http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/
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TABLE 2 | Questionnaire data.
Questionnaire Minimum Maximum Mean SD
STAI-T 24 60 38.74 9.64
BDI 0 16 4.23 3.82
NEO—Neuroticism 2 37 18.11 7.73
NEO—Extraversion 14 45 31.48 7.35
NEO—Conscientiousness 12 48 30.89 8.23
TCI—Novelty seeking 1 36 22.02 7.45
TCI—Harm avoidance 0 31 11.42 6.91
BIS-11 (Total) 44 95 66.81 9.76
Descriptive statistics for all questionnaires used in the factor analysis, only for
participants who had no missing values and who were therefore included in the
factor analysis and in all analyses that involved factor scores (n = 62).
set of questionnaires. We essentially replicated the results of
our factor analysis in that cohort (see Supplementary Table
S1).
RTs During Task and their Relation to
Anxiety-Depression and Impulsivity
Median accuracy for all participants on the task was 99.6% (range
92% – 100%). In the analysis of RTs to the target stimuli, we
found a main effect of delay (F(1.95,138.28) = 12.97, p < 0.001),
and magnitude, (F(1.95,138.51) = 46.81, p < 0.001), but no
interaction of delay × magnitude, (F(3.61,256.43) = 1.12, p = 0.35;
Figure 2). When including the factor scores Anxiety-Depression
and Impulsivity as covariates, there were no main effects of these
factors and no interactions between either these factors and delay
or magnitude (all F < 1.10, all p > 0.30), suggesting that neither
Anxiety-Depression nor Impulsivity affected RTs. Covarying for
smoking status did not change the overall pattern of results.
To follow up the main ANOVA, we carried out four post
hoc tests to determine the nature of the significant main effects
of delay and magnitude (in n = 72). We applied a Bonferroni-
corrected significance threshold (α = 0.05/4 = 0.0125). When
testing for the main effect of delay, we found that the mean
of the median RTs for immediate rewards were lower than
RTs for delayed rewards (10 days, or 100 days, averaged;
T71 = 4.81, p < 0.0001). However the mean of the median
RTs for 10-days-rewards and 100-days-rewards did not differ
(T71 = −0.36, p = 0.719). This indicates that participants
TABLE 3 | Pattern matrix from the factor analysis.
Component
1 2
Questionnaire Anxiety-Depression Impulsivity
NEO—Neuroticism 0.84 0.16
TCI—Harm Avoidance 0.84 −0.24
STAI—T 0.82 0.22
NEO—Extraversion −0.73 0.42
BDI 0.70 0.23
TCI—Novelty Seeking −0.33 0.86
BIS-11—Total score 0.19 0.81
NEO—Conscientiousness −0.39 −0.67
Factor loadings higher than 0.60 are marked in bold.
FIGURE 2 | Reaction times (RTs). Means of the median RTs per condition
(n = 72). There were significant main effects of magnitude and delay, but there
was no interaction effect of magnitude × delay. Results of the post hoc tests
concerning effects of delay are shown in the figure. Error bars denote 95%
confidence intervals (C.I.) of the mean, adjusted for within-subject designs
(Loftus and Masson, 1994). ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
responded fast for immediate rewards, and slower for delayed
rewards irrespective of the period of delay. Magnitude of the
reward, on the other hand, affected RTs in a value-dependent
fashion, namely the mean of the median RTs for 0.05e were
longer than those for 0.50e (T71 = 2.84, p = 0.006), and
RTs for 0.50e were longer than those for 1e (T71 = 6.90,
p< 0.0001).
fMRI Results
Validation of the Study Design: Effects of Magnitude
on BOLD-Signal During Anticipation and
Win-Outcome
We first aimed to validate our study design by testing for effects
of reward magnitude (1e > 0.05e) during anticipation and
win-outcome. Replicating the results of previous studies, there
was an effect of magnitude in the VS [peak in MNI-space [x
y z] = [9 8 −2], T = 5.38, p < 0.0001, FWE-corrected for
ROI volume] during anticipation. Further in line with previous
studies, during the outcome phase we found effects of reward
magnitude in the mPFC [peak in MNI-space [x y z] = [6 41
19], T = 6.65, p < 0.00001, FWE-corrected for ROI volume]
and in the right VS/NAcc [peak in MNI-space [x y z] = [12 8
−11], T = 4.33, p = 0.002, FWE-corrected for the ROI volume;
Figure 3A. These results indicate that our design worked as
intended.
Effects of Immediacy on BOLD-Signal During the
Anticipation Phase
Although the main goal of our study was to assess the
neural correlates of delay discounting in the outcome
phase, we also analyzed the anticipatory phase of the
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FIGURE 3 | Effects in the outcome phase for win-trials. Effects of magnitude (1e > 0.05e, (A), serves as validation of the study design), immediacy (0 days >
10 and 100 days, (B)), and immediacy × magnitude (1e > 0.05e for 0 days compared to 10 and 100 days, (C); n = 72). For visualization, activations are shown at
p < 0.001, uncorrected and masked by the respective ROI (medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), amygdala, or VS). All peaks survive p < 0.017, FWE-correction for ROI
volumes. T-values and MNI coordinates [x y z] are given for the peaks of the activations. Bar plots visualize the results by showing the mean beta values within a
sphere around the peak voxel of each region (radius: 5 mm). Error bars denote 95% C.I. of the mean, adjusted for within-subject designs (Loftus and Masson, 1994).
MID task. However, we found no effects of delay (i.e.,
immediacy, or 10 days vs. 100 days) or of the interaction
of immediacy × magnitude that were significant after
correction (p < 0.05, FWE-corrected for the ROI volumes).
Because there were no robust effects of delay during
anticipation, we did not further examine influences of
Anxiety-Depression or Impulsivity on brain activation during
anticipation.
Effects of Immediacy on BOLD-Signal During the
Win-Outcome Phase
Immediacy of reward delivery was associated with increased
BOLD response within a dorsal portion of the mPFC in response
to immediate as compared to delayed rewards (peak in MNI-
space [x y z] = [0 38 22], T = 4.19, p = 0.014, FWE-corrected
for ROI volume; Figure 3B). A direct comparison of the BOLD
response between delay conditions (10 days vs. 100 days) yielded
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no reliable differences in the ROIs, even at a very liberal threshold
(p< 0.01, k = 5, uncorrected).
We next tested for interactions of immediacy and reward
magnitude. Specifically, we investigated which brain regions
showed a more pronounced effect of magnitude (1e vs. 0.05e)
for immediate as compared to delayed rewards. Such a pattern
was observed in the left amygdala (Figure 3C; peak inMNI-space
[x y z] = [−18 −7 −17], T = 4.75, k = 10, p = 0.00014, FWE-
corrected for ROI volume).
Correlations of Neural Delay Effects in the
Win-Outcome Phase with Impulsivity and
Anxiety-Depression
We then tested for a potential relationship between the
BOLD response to immediate vs. delayed rewards during the
outcome phase and the personality traits of interest (Impulsivity,
Anxiety-Depression). To this end, we computed correlations
between individual neural immediacy effects (betawin_immediate
– betawin_delayed) in the mPFC and amygdala (betas averaged
in 5 mm spheres around the peak voxel) and the Anxiety-
Depression and Impulsivity scores from our factor analysis.
Immediacy effects in mPFC were not normally distributed
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov p = 0.039), while they were normally
distributed in the amygdala (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p ≥ 0.20).
Therefore we used non-parametric Spearman’s correlation for
the mPFC analysis and parametric Pearson’s correlation for the
amygdala analysis.
We found that immediacy effects in the mPFC correlated
positively with Anxiety-Depression (rs = 0.306, p = 0.016,
two-tailed, n = 62, Figure 4A), while immediacy effects in the
left amygdala correlated positively with Impulsivity (r = 0.407, p
= 0.001, two-tailed, n = 62, Figure 4B).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we investigated the neural correlates
of delay discounting during reward outcome processing in
healthy participants as well as their relationship with individual
differences in impulsivity and anxious-depressive traits. We
found that a region within the dorsal mPFC exhibited stronger
activation for delivery of immediate as opposed for delayed
monetary rewards. Moreover, the left amygdala showed an
interaction of immediacy and reward magnitude, in that it
encoded magnitude only for immediate rewards. Personality
traits that had previously been linked to altered delay discounting
were found to be associated with the amygdala and mPFC
responses in a trait-specific way: While the left amygdala
immediacy response was more pronounced in impulsive
participants, the immediacy response in the mPFC was more
pronounced in participants with anxious-depressive traits.
Delay Discounting in the Outcome Phase
Effects of Immediacy on the mPFC
Previous studies have demonstrated that the mPFC responds to
the delivery of predicted rewards during the outcome phase of
MID tasks and that it further codes the magnitude of rewards
(Knutson et al., 2001b; Hommer et al., 2003; Schott et al., 2007).
The present study demonstrates that mPFC activation does not
only code the mere magnitude of an outcome, but also its time of
FIGURE 4 | Correlations of immediacy effects in the win-outcome phase with personality. Correlations of neural immediacy effects (betawin_immediate –
betawin_delayed) in the mPFC (A) and in the left amygdala (B) with the factor scores Impulsivity and Anxiety-Depression (n = 62). On the left side of the figure, activations
for these regions from the main analysis are shown at p < 0.001, uncorrected. Coordinates [x y z] refer to MNI-space. ∗Significant at p < 0.05 (framed in bold).
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delivery: the dorsal mPFC shows a more pronounced response to
immediate relative to delayed rewards. Compatibly, Sripada et al.
(2011) observed that mPFC activity was higher during decisions
that involved one immediate option relative to decisions between
two delayed options, although in a somewhat more anterior and
ventral region of the mPFC.
The most straightforward explanation of our mPFC finding
is that activation in this region reflects the representation or
computation of subjective value during the outcome phase.
However, as subjective value was not directlymeasured and as the
typical locus of subjective value activations in decision-making
paradigms is more ventral (Rangel and Hare, 2010) alternative
explanations should be considered. First, our results may relate
to the role of the dorsal mPFC in triggering and mobilizing
cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004; Ridderinkhof et al.,
2004). This process might occur automatically, possibly in order
to counteract the tempting nature of immediate rewards (see
Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2004). Second, more pronounced mPFC
responses to immediate rewards might also reflect increased self-
relevance of immediate rewards, since mPFC has been related
to self-referential processing (e.g., Gusnard et al., 2001) and
also, more specifically, to confirmatory self-referential responses
(Sajonz et al., 2010). Third, activation of the mPFC subregion
might simply signal immediacy itself (see Sripada et al., 2011).
Effects of Immediacy on the Amygdala
An interaction of immediacy and magnitude was observed
in the left amygdala, where magnitude was only encoded for
immediate rewards. In addition to its well-known role in emotion
processing, the amygdala may also, more generally, respond to
stimulus salience or relevance (Liberzon et al., 2003; Ewbank
et al., 2009; Mahler and Berridge, 2009; Schardt et al., 2010).
In line with the notion of the amygdala as a relevance or
salience detector, irrespective of valence, individual variability of
dopaminergic signaling has been linked to amygdala responses
during both reward processing (Schott et al., 2008) and aversive
emotional stimulation (Kienast et al., 2008). With respect to our
present findings, this could be interpreted as indicating that the
amygdala codes an integrated salience or relevance signal that
encompasses both magnitude and immediacy of an obtained
reward. However, further studies employing both appetitive and
aversive reinforcement will be required to systematically address
this question (e.g., see Camara et al., 2009).
All-or-None Effects of Delay
Neither themPFC nor the VS or amygdala differentiated between
the two delay conditions (10 days vs. 100 days). This was
mirrored by the behavioral results of the classification task,
in which participants exhibited no significant reaction time
differences between rewards delivered in 10 days vs. 100 days,
while responses to immediate rewards were significantly faster
than those to delayed rewards. This is compatible with the
previous observation that the mPFC and the striatum primarily
activate during choices involving immediate rewards, showing
no further differentiation between rewards delivered after 2
weeks or 1 month (McClure et al., 2004). Our results expand
the observation by McClure and colleagues, showing that such
a pattern also applies to the valuation phase in isolation. While
we cannot rule out that increasing the difference between delays
even further (e.g., 5 days vs. 1 year) might ultimately lead to
measurable neural differences between the delays (Kable and
Glimcher, 2010), our results support the idea that immediacy
per se is an important factor contributing to the salience of stimuli
(see McClure et al., 2004, 2007). Alternatively, or additionally,
because participants did not engage in decision-making, they
might have—implicitly or explicitly—ignored the difference
between the 10-day and 100-day delays.
Consideration on the Outcome Phase for Delayed
Rewards
Finally, one might note that the outcome phase in this fMRI
paradigm did not involve the receipt of an actual reward in the
very same moment. It is, of course, logically impossible to receive
a reward that will be delivered delayed in time (but see Prévost
et al., 2010, for paradigms that involve actually waiting for the
delivery of delayed rewards during neuroimaging; Jimura et al.,
2013). Rather, our paradigm involved the promise to receive the
amount immediately after scanning or following a certain delay
after scanning, thus comparing very short to moderate and long
delays.
No Delay Discounting in the Anticipation
Phase
In contrast to a previous study that investigated the neural
correlates of delay discounting with an MID task (Luo et al.,
2009), we found no effects of delay during the anticipation of
rewards. Most notably, we could not replicate the immediacy
effect in the mPFC during reward anticipation, but only in the
outcome phase. One reason for this might be the complexity
of our paradigm that included nine different types of reward
(three rewardmagnitudes times three delays), as compared to the
(simpler) two-by-two design employed by Luo and colleagues.
Thus, in our paradigm, participants might have experienced
some difficulty integrating the complex symbolic anticipatory
cues in order to form a mental representation of both the
magnitude and the delay of the anticipated reward. Instead, they
might only have formed a clear representation of the presumably
most salient feature, namely the magnitude of the reward during
the anticipation, which had strong effects in the VS also in the
current study.
One result of our study that speaks for such an incomplete
representation of the expected rewards in the anticipation phase
is the fact that the VS showed a magnitude effect also during
the outcome phase. Previous studies have demonstrated that, in
young healthy participants, the VS is activated primarily during
the anticipation phase of MID tasks, but not during the outcome
phase (Knutson et al., 2001b). This pattern is, however, widely
believed to depend on the predictability of rewards (Schultz
et al., 2000; Berns et al., 2001; Spicer et al., 2007). In our
paradigm, rewards were delivered to correct responses in only
60% of trials. Therefore, the EV of the rewards was reduced
during the anticipation phase, while reward delivery during the
outcome phase was likely to elicit a positive prediction error
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(e.g., Pagnoni et al., 2002). With respect to the mPFC, the
uncertainty during reward anticipation might have led to the
delayed valuation of the rewards to the outcome phase.
It must be noted, though, that during the classification task,
participants exhibited shorter RTs to immediate vs. delayed
rewards. It can thus not be excluded that neural activation
differences during the anticipation phase might not have been
picked up due to lack of statistical power, particularly when the
variance explanation by the delay effects was small compared to
that of the magnitude effects.
Individual Differences in the Neural
Correlates of Delay Discounting in the
Outcome Phase
In addition to investigating the neural correlates of the valuation
component of delay discounting during the outcome phase,
a second aim of our study was to investigate how delay
discounting relates to interindividual variability of personality
traits that are implicated in neuropsychiatric disorders. To
this end, we performed a factor analysis on several well-
established questionnaires, namely the NEO-FFI, the TCI, the
BIS-11, the STAI-T, and the BDI. Two factors were reliably
identified, and considering the contributing variables, they were
labeled Anxiety-Depression and Impulsivity (Table 3). With
previous studies demonstrating that impulsivity is associated
with increased delay discounting (e.g., deWit et al., 2007; Mobini
et al., 2007), and some evidence for a correlation of delay
discounting with anxiety-related traits (Rounds et al., 2007), we
aimed to correlate the brain activation patterns observed as a
function of immediacy with these two traits.
Correlation of Impulsivity with Immediacy Effects in
the Amygdala
Previous studies investigating the relationship between
impulsivity and the neural correlates of reward processing
have mostly focused on the response of the striatum. Those
studies have yielded partly conflicting results, as both positive
(e.g., Forbes et al., 2007) and negative (Beck et al., 2009)
correlations between ventral striatal reward responses and
impulsivity have been reported. A recent meta-analysis suggests
that the relationship between impulsivity-related personality
traits and the striatal reward response might depend on the
population investigated, with healthy participants showing
positive correlations of impulsivity and striatal reward responses,
while patient populations with clinically relevant levels of
impulsivity may show the opposite pattern (Plichta and Scheres,
2014).
With the focus of the present study being the investigation
of delay effects, we did not compute correlations of individual
differences with the striatal reward response, as striatal activity
was not modulated by delay. Rather we tested for correlations
in the amygdala and the mPFC, which both showed effects
of immediacy in the outcome phase. We found that the
factor Impulsivity correlated positively with the response of
the left amygdala to immediate vs. delayed rewards in the
outcome phase. As discussed above, the amygdala, apart
from its well-characterized function in emotion processing, is
also believed to convey the signaling of stimulus salience or
relevance (Liberzon et al., 2003; Ewbank et al., 2009; Mahler
and Berridge, 2009; Schardt et al., 2010). Studies of the
neural mechanisms of impulsivity have previously identified
the amygdala as an important anatomical structure mediating
impulsivity. Volumetric investigations point to a role of the
amygdala in motor impulsivity (Gopal et al., 2013), and
impulsivity correlates positively with the amygdala response to
winning monetary rewards in a slot-machine game (Shao et al.,
2013). Our results are in line with the latter finding and extend
it by showing that high impulsivity is not only associated with
a more pronounced amygdala response to winning rewards in
general, but rather, that impulsive individuals are also specifically
more responsive to winning immediate as compared to delayed
rewards. This is in line with most definitions of impulsivity that
center around the idea that impulsive individuals are focused on
the present and on short-term gratification (e.g., see Evenden,
1999). It also complies with a recent connectionist model of
intertemporal choice in which impulsivity was modeled as a
reduced response threshold, leading to faster choices and an
attenuated influence of the value of delayed rewards (Scherbaum
et al., 2012). In summary, our results strengthen the notion that,
in addition to the well-known role of the striatum in impulsivity,
the preference for immediate rewards in impulsive individuals
may at least in part be mediated by the amygdala.
From a clinical point of view, the positive direction of the
correlation between immediacy-related amygdala responses and
impulsivity is noteworthy, as amygdala hyperactivity has been
repeatedly observed in Borderline personality disorder (BPD;
Krause-Utz et al., 2014), a psychiatric condition characterized
by dysfunctional levels of impulsivity that often lead to self-
harming behaviors in the affected patients. Delay discounting
is very pronounced in BPD patients (Barker et al., 2015), and
future studies should investigate a potential role of amygdala
hyperactivity in delay discounting in this patient group.
Correlation of Anxiety-Depression with Immediacy
Effects in the mPFC
While the positive relationship between Impulsivity and
immediacy-related amygdala activity was well in line with our
hypotheses, the observation that Anxiety-Depression correlated
positively with the mPFC immediacy response was not predicted.
As the immediacy effect in the mPFC itself has no satisfying
single explanation, as discussed above, the interpretation of
correlations within the mPFC remains largely speculative. We
will constrain our discussion to two possibilities.
The first explanation relates to the possible role of the mPFC
in coding subjective value (Hare et al., 2009; Kahnt et al.,
2011; Park et al., 2011). The correlation of mPFC activation
with Anxiety-Depression would then suggest that (subclinical)
anxious-depressive individuals overvalue immediate and/or
undervalue delayed rewards. This is compatible with a cardinal
feature of clinical depression, the so-called Beck’s triad (Beck,
1987), which is a pessimistic view of the self, the world and,
relevant to this interpretation, the future. It is also in line with
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findings by Rounds et al. (2007) who reported increased delay
discounting in individuals with social anxiety.
A second possibility is that the correlative findings relate to a
role of the mPFC in triggering or mobilizing cognitive control in
the outcome phase of immediate rewards (Botvinick et al., 2004;
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). In this case the described would mean
that anxious-depressive participants trigger or mobilize more
cognitive control for immediate rewards, for example because
they might ruminate and worry more about receiving—or not
receiving—rewards. However, these interpretations are highly
tentative at this point and will have to be tested in future,
specifically designed experiments.
Future research should expand this approach to populations
with clinically relevant levels of anxious-depressive traits, like
patients with affective disorders, anxiety or personality disorders
like Borderline or avoidant personality disorder. One previous
study has suggested reduced delay discounting in patients with
social anxiety disorder (Rounds et al., 2007), and several authors
have pointed out the role of medial prefrontal and rostral
anterior cingulate dysfunction—and possibly hyperfunction—in
these disorders (Lemogne et al., 2012; Holtmann et al., 2013;
Adhikari, 2014). The observation that anxious-depressive traits
correlate positively with the neural immediacy effect in healthy
participants points to the possibility that mPFC dysfunction in
patients with clinical levels of depression or anxiety might also
result in increased delay discounting.
Subjective Value as an Alternative
Explanation
One potential limitation of the present study design is that the
effects of immediacy and magnitude might also be, at least in
part, attributable to subjective value, as an immediate reward of
a certain magnitude has a higher overall subjective value than a
delayed reward of the samemagnitude. Luo et al. (2009) aimed to
circumvent this problem by creating preference-matched stimuli
for each participant and could still observe delay discounting
effects. In the present study, however, we decided against this
approach, because we were interested in individual differences
of the valuation process in relation to impulsive and anxious-
depressive personality traits. We argued that the correlation of
delay discounting effects with decreased overall subjective value
is inherent to the phenomenon, since delay discounting is a
process of devaluation. Nevertheless, this might constitute a
potential limitation of the current study. That is, we can, as of
now, not exclude the possibility that, even though we focused
on brain structures that responded to immediacy or immediacy-
magnitude interactions rather than reward magnitude per se,
the observed brain-behavior correlations also relate to overall
subjective value of the rewards.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, our study demonstrates that immediate vs.
delayed delivery of rewards engages activity of mPFC and the
amygdala during the processing of reward outcome. This pattern
of activation is further associated with individual differences in
both impulsivity and anxious-depressive traits, with impulsivity
correlating positively with immediacy-related amygdala activity,
while anxious-depressive traits correlate with immediacy-related
mPFC activity.
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